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Agriculture plays a dual role in the climate change debate: first, it is a major source of 
greenhouse gas emissions; second, agriculture provides major mitigation opportunities, for 
example via soil carbon sequestration. Agriculture’s contribution to global GHG emissions is 
estimated to be 10 to 14 percent of total emissions (Smith et al. 2007; Baumert, Herzog, and 
Pershing 2005; FAO 2009b). Agriculture is the largest source of no-CO2 GHG emissions, 
generating 52% and 84% of total methane and nitrous oxide emissions, respectively. Emissions 
from agriculture are increasing rapidly and are expected to continue to increase in the next 
decades. There are also prospects for mitigation. Smith et al. (2008) assess the economic 
potential of agricultural mitigation of GHG emissions including livestock-based and cropland 
options. The global technical GHG mitigation potential for agriculture by 2030 was estimated to 
be about 5500-6600 Mt CO2-eq.year
-1. Most of the GHG mitigation potential in agriculture 
comes from soil carbon sequestration. Soil carbon sequestration represents an important 
mitigation option, potentially more viable than N2O reductions (USEPA 2006).  
 
A small but growing body of literature investigates the conditions favoring adoption of climate 
change mitigation practices by farmers in developing countries. The analysis is generally kept 
straightforward: virtually all authors, (Stavins 1999, Antle 2002; Gonzales-Estrada et al. 2008 
among many) assume that a risk-neutral farmer will try to maximize the present value of the 
stream of net benefits that derive from farming land. A farmer will therefore adopt mitigation 
practices when the net present value of farming with these practices is greater than with the 
alternatives. Uncertainty and risk-aversion is notably absent in the modeling of farmers’ adoption 
of climate change mitigation practices in developing countries. However, as Antle and 
Stoorvogel (2008) point out: “it is important to note that risk could impact farmers’ willingness 
to participate in carbon contracts both positively and negatively.” Furthermore, it should be 
noted that of the twenty mitigation practices identified in a recent FAO report (FAO 2009a), 
seventeen explicitly have an effect on yield variability, of which, fourteen reduce variability 
(Table 1). There is plenty of evidence that farmers are not likely to be neutral to risk and actually 
tend to be risk averse (Antle 1987; Chavas and Holt 1990; Bar-Shira, Just, and Zilberman 1997; 
Hennessy 1998; Just and Pope 2002; Serra et al. 2006; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2007) and that risk 
considerations affect input usage and technology adoption (Just and Zilberman 1983; Feder, Just, and Zilberman 1985; Kebede 1992). We therefore believe that risk considerations cannot be 
ignored in the analysis of the impact of payments for carbon sequestration.  
 
The main objective of this paper is to explore some of the implications for climate change 
mitigation projects of modeling farmers as risk-neutral while in actuality they behave as risk-
averse agents. As it will be analyzed later in the paper, the inclusion of risk considerations 
provides important insights on the reasons programs can succeed or fail and in the complexities 
of program implementation. 
 
Effects of the Risk-neutrality Assumption 
To further appreciate the theoretical aspect of the problem and the potential importance of 
accounting for risk-aversion, we exploit Feder’s analysis of risk-averse farmers and input choices 
(Feder, 1980). We show that it is possible to overestimate the cost of inducing adoption of a 
yield-variability-reducing input when in presence of risk aversion. Consider a Just and Pope (Just 
and Pope, 1978) formulation of the production function: 
 
                 
Where q indicates output, y is the average output, x is an input,   is a random variable with mean 
zero, and      is a term that determines output variability. Also assume that: 
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A researcher observes a farmer who uses input x in the amount of    assuming that the choice is 
the result of an expected profit maximization process for a risk-neutral farmer. 
The risk-neutral farmer will use input   in amount equal to    such that:  
  ′        ′     
Assume one could require the farmer to use more of input x, buying x at its market price w. The 
change in expected profit is given by: 
dE Π       ′          ′       One could compensate the farmer by giving her a lump-sum such that the expected profit 
remains unchanged: 
dE Π       ′          ′              0 
Which is to say, the lump sum    is “tailored” to a risk-neutral farmer such that if the farmer 
uses more of input x she will not be worse off than in her original situation. Suppose the farmer 
is in actuality risk-averse and had chosen    to maximizes expected utility  
E U Π    E  U    x           x      x     
where the utility function has the following characteristics:  
U′  0 ; U ′′  0  
Consider the effect on expected utility of the change imposed on the farmer inclusive of the lump 
sum payment: 
dE U Π    E  U′      ′ x          ′ x        ′ x           , 
is the change in expected utility dE U Π   also equal to zero? 
Note that:   ′          ′              0 and therefore: 
dE U Π    E  U′       ′ x      . 
Given the non-stochastic nature of  , ′,  : 
dE U Π        ′ x     E U′       . 
Since  ′  0 ;  0 ;    0 , the sign of dE U Π   depends of the sign of E U′        and since 
E U′        is always <0 (for a detailed demonstration see the appendix A in Feder 1980), it 
follows that dE U Π    0 . 
Therefore, a payment that compensates a farmer for the use a of a yield-variability-reducing 
input beyond optimality, and the payment is such that leaves expected profit unchanged, 
increases the expected utility of a risk-averse farmer. Similarly, if the use of an input increases yield variability, the payment for a risk-neutral farmer underestimates the payment necessary for 
a risk-averse farmer that keeps utility constant.  
An Empirical Application 
As mentioned in the introduction, what motivates this paper are the numerous studies that have 
investigated the conditions for adoption of climate change mitigation practices assuming that 
farmers ignore risk in valuing their production decisions. The approach is best exemplified by 
Antle (2002) where the net present value of switching form a land use or agronomic practice j to 
a carbon-sequestering practice i is expressed as follows: 
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Where, r is the annual interest rate, NR is the net returns for agronomic practice i in period t, 
given product price p, input prices w ,   ∆   is the per-tonne payment,     ,   is the 
maintenance cost per period for changing from system j to i, and    ,   are fixed cost for 
changing from system j to system i. Given this framework the farmers switches to the carbon-
sequestering land use or practice if  
     ,              
 
For our empirical application we will be looking at profit rather than net present value although 
this simplification that does not detract from the general point made in this paper.  
 
We follow Just and Pope and assume that farmers’ per hectare production function can be 
represented by the following:    
      ,            
Where,   indicates output,   is a variable input and   vector of fixed inputs,   is a random 
variable with mean zero, and      determines output variability
1. 
                                                 
1 We acknowledge here that we are making the simplifying assumption input interactions do not 
influence output variance. We also assume that farmers’ profit is defined as follows:  
Π        ,                  ,       
where   is the output price, and   is a payment for a positive externality generated by farmers 
(carbon sequestration in our case). This implies that the mean and standard deviation of profit 
are: 
 Π        ,       ,       and  Π           
We choose to model our representative farmer as a risk-averse agent and we assume that her 
utility can be characterized by a mean-standard deviation utility function. Explored originally by 
Tobin (1958) and Markowitz (1959) and then rediscovered and clarified by Meyer (1987), the 
mean-standard deviation approach is appealing for its simplicity and tractability. Meyer 
demonstrated that under certain conditions, the location-scale condition and convexity in the 
mean- standard deviation space, the expected utility and mean standard deviation are analytically 
equivalent. However, part of the economic literature (Saha 1997, Ormiston and Shlee 2001, Isik 
and Khanna 2003, Eichner 2008) takes the mean-standard deviation approach as a framework 
that stands on its own. The advantage of this approach is the flexibility in representing risk 
attitudes and their empirical tractability. As we will discuss later in the paper, we believe that for 
a correct planning of policies promoting adoption of mitigation practices farmers’ risk attitudes 
cannot be ignored. We therefore opted to use the mean-standard deviation approach which lends 
itself more easily to be in empirical studies.   
Consequently, we follow Saha (1997) and we assume that farmers’ preferences can be 
represented by a mean-standard deviation utility function V  ,     μθ   σγ where θ is assumed 
to be greater than 0. Under this specification, farmers’ attitude towards risk is captured by the 




θμ  θσγ   . Risk aversion 
(neutrality) [affinity] corresponds to         0. Under the assumption of risk aversion, 
decreasing (constant) [increasing] absolute risk aversion preferences require         1. 
Furthermore, decreasing (constant) [increasing] relative risk aversion is denoted by    
       . 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
The simulation settings 
The objective of the program sketched in our simulations is to induce farmers to adopt climate 
change mitigation practices. In order to simplify the simulation settings, we concern ourselves 
only with carbon sequestration and assume that sequestration is dependent directly (and only) on 
usage of input x. We also assume that producers are operating with an optimal choice of inputs 
without the program, hence any change in the amount of input x used will make them less well 
off. We want to compute the lump-sum payment S necessary to make producers indifferent 
between using or not using prescribed levels of x.  
Under profit maximization the farmers adopts the carbon sequestering input if  
Π       Π  
While under utility maximization the conditions for adoptions are the following: 
U Π   S ,σA     U  Π ,σA  
Our initial conditions are that the relative price of the input under consideration is high enough to 
make its use unprofitable and that therefore farmers are not using the input
2. We wish to simulate 
a payment program which will move farmers from no usage to some target amount xT. The use 
of this input will have a direct effect on yields, but also on yield-variability and the amount of 
carbon sequestered in the soil.  
We used the DSSAT crop modeling system (Hoogenboom and Jones 2004; Jones, Thornton, and 
Heinke 2009) to simulate maize yields and soil carbon content. Crop simulation models are a 
process based approach to numerically growing a crop. Starting with weather data, soil data, and 
management practices, the model grows the plant by considering the water, sunshine, and 
available nutrients in order to grow the virtual roots, stems, leaves, and fruits. The models are 
approximations based on a physiologic understanding of the particular plant with the details 
being calibrated against field trials. A necessary part of this process is a soil model (CENTURY) 
                                                 
2 The motivation for this choice, besides that it simplifies the modeling settings, are the many observed cases where 
ecologically friendly practices are not utilized even though basic economic analysis predicts that such practices 
would be more profitable than the alternative choices.  We are trying to capture this common situation in a pure 
neoclassical setting without resorting to problems related to institutions, market imperfections, knowledge gaps, and 
the like. which keeps track of water and nutrients extracted from the soil (and the fertilizers and irrigation 
water added) as well as the decomposition of organic matter. This constellation of features 
makes crop models powerful tools for analyzing management practices. In our case, we are 
interested in yield levels and variability as well as changes in soil organic carbon content 
resulting from applying different amounts of organic matter.  
We simulated a very simple cropping system that alternates maize during the growing season 
with fallow ground during the off-season for twenty years. The daily weather data were 
simulated using DSSAT’s internal stochastic weather generator. For each year we record the 
yield as well as the soil carbon content. In order to obtain an estimate of yield variability, we 
repeated the entire process 100 times using a different random seed each time. The input we 
investigated was an organic soil amendment, such as green manure (no other fertilizers were 
used), and we simulated 13 levels of use intensity, ranging from zero to 20 tons per hectare. 
Through this series of simulations we obtain yields, yield-variability, as well as the soil carbon 
content at the end of the period.  
Simulated yields were used to compute profit. The output price was set to $0.42/kg (this price 
was taken from González-Estrada et al. 2008). The input price was chosen as the lowest possible 
price that ensures that the producer would choose not to use the input, under both risk-neutrality 
and risk-aversion. For this particular combination of choices, an input price of $0.0739 worked 
well. The profit function is derived directly from the input costs and yield simulations from 
DSSAT while the mean-standard deviation utility function is V  ,     μ .    σ . . 
 
Figure 1 provides a representation of the production function for two different years, years two 
and twenty. The simulation seems to indicate that increasing green-manure application from 
seven to nine tons per hectare has a remarkable effect on yields. This rapid increase in output is 
observed for all years even though the input-output ratio changes through time as can be seen 
both in  
Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 2 shows how the yields change through time for several different 
levels of input usage. The differences in yields both through time and with respect to the amendment amount are due to the continuously evolving soil characteristics as new manure is 
incorporated into the soil and the plant draw nutrients from it. 
We are particularly interested on the effect of input usage on yield variability. This is shown in 
Figure 3. Since soil characteristics evolve through time due to both the uptake of soil nutrients 
during production and green-manure applications, the effect is different for different years. It is 
important to note how different input applications can increase or decrease yield variability 
compared to no usage. For example, for year 2 from about 9000 kg of manure, yield variability is 
lower than with no input usage. However, note how in year 20, the standard deviation is higher 
than no usage for virtually all levels of applications. 
Once yields and standard deviation are simulated, it is possible to determine the payment 
necessary to induce participation at each input level. This is achieved by setting the utility under 
participation (with the higher input usage) equal to the utility without participation and solving 
for the payment. Figure 4 shows the sum of all the minimum yearly payments necessary to 
induce adoption under profit and utility maximization. Given our assumptions about the utility 
function, if the quantity of input use results in higher yield variability the payment necessary to 
induce adoption will be higher under risk aversion than under risk neutrality. The opposite is true 
when the use of the input reduces the yiled standard deviation. This is reflected in Figure 4. For 
example, applications in the range of five tons of green manure (in general) increase yield 
standard deviation and this acts as a penalty for a risk farmer. The resulting minimum payment to 
induce adoption is higher under risk-aversion than risk-neutrality. Conversely, applying some ten 
tons of the input decreases yield standard deviation and this results in payments for risk-averse 
farmers that are lower than risk-neutral farmers. The result is that there are levels of input usage - 
below some 8,400 Kg/hectare and above some 17,800 Kg/hectare - for which the total payments 
necessary to induce adoption are higher under a risk-aversion assumption compared to risk-
neutrality. In between these input quantities, the total necessary payments are lower for a risk-
averse farmer.  
The DSSAT crop modeling system can be used to simulate the amount of soil organic carbon 
stored in the soil. Considering the soil organic carbon accumulated under the no use scenario our 
baseline, we can compute the additional amount of carbon stored in soils under the adoption 
scenario. Figure 5 shows graphically the difference between the soil carbon at the end of each year as compared with using no green manure. Thus, the blue line representing no input usage is 
coincident with the x-axis. Once the payments necessary to induce adoption and the additional 
carbon stored in soil are computed, we can calculate the implicit cost of sequestering 
atmospheric carbon from the program manager’s point of view as shown in Figure 6. The lowest 
cost per ton of sequester carbon is about $67.5 under risk-neutrality assumption while for a risk-
averse farmer the lowest cost is about $49.0.  
Discussion of the Results and Conclusions 
It is well known that programs aiming to induce adoption of carbon-sequestering practices by 
offering a per-hectare payment are not cost effective because will attract farmers that have a 
marginal cost of abatement lower or equal to the payment. The inefficiencies are so high that, as 
Antle et al. (2003) demonstrate, even programs that offer a payment per ton of carbon 
sequestered can be more cost efficient once a carefully executed sampling survey is put in place. 
Their work clearly exposes the extra costs a project can incur when important economic 
principles are ignored. Our findings also suggest that simple per-hectare payment schemes may 
incur in many problems.  
As expected, our results indicate that when risk-averse farmers are modeled as risk-neutral 
agents, the size of the incentives needed to induce participation to a carbon sequestration 
program is miscalculated. Payments computed using a risk-neutral framework are either higher 
than necessary when farmers experience a reduction in risk or, when farmers confront an 
increase in production risk, lower than required to induce the adoption of desirable practices. 
These results are entirely due to the inclusion of risk considerations in the farmer’s decision 
process. It is important to note that the differences in payments and implicit cost of carbon 
reported in this study depend completely upon the details of the assumptions and on the 
parameters that characterize the utility function. For example, it can be seen in Figure 7 that the 
implicit cost of carbon changes as the value of the parameter gamma is varied. 
The lowest price of a ton of carbon for these values of gamma range from $67.5 to $48.9. 
Conceptually, when the input reduces yield variability, risk-averse preferences could drive the 
carbon price arbitrarily close to zero (or even negative meaning that farmer would actually prefer 
to use the input rather than not). In the other direction, if the input actually increases variability, then the payment necessary to induce participation can grow unboundedly depending on how 
much the producers wish to avoid uncertainty. 
All this suggests that more empirical work on estimating risk attitudes of farmers in developing 
countries is needed. We believe that this work is important for the implementation of climate 
change mitigation programs and payment for environmental services in general. The 
heterogeneity of the pool of potential participants with their risk attitudes will have a strong 
impact on the payment needed to induce adoption and complicate considerably the 
implementation of these types of programs. Our simulations suggest that programs that promote 
the adoption of risk-reducing practices can incur in lower costs and that maybe the focus should 
be put on those agronomic techniques that decrease production risk. In this regard, education and 
information distribution (e.g., extension systems) lie somewhere between important and 
essential. It is still possible that risk -increasing agronomic practices could, in principle provide 
low carbon prices if they provide a sufficiently high capacity of sequestering carbon. 
   
Figure 1. Yields for different levels of input usage in year two and twenty. 
 
 
Figure 2. Effect of various input usage on yields at different points in time 
 
 
 Figure 3. Effect of the input usage on yield variability for years two and twenty. 
 
Figure 4. Total payments necessary to induce adoption under risk-aversion and risk-neutrality for different 
levels of input usage* 
    
*Note: For simplicity we assume an interest rate equal to 0.  
 
 Figure 5. Soil organic carbon accumulation expressed in CO2 for different application rates 
  
 








 Table 1: Agricultural mitigation practices and impact on yield variability 
Improved agronomic practices   
Use of cover crops  Reduced variability due to increased soil fertility, water holding capacity 
Improved crop/fallow rotations  Reduced variability due to increased soil fertility, water holding capacity 
Improved crop varieties  Reduced variability where varieties are developed for resilience; greater 
diversity of seed varieties should reduce variability at the local/sub-national 
level 
Use of legumes in crop rotation    
Integrated nutrient management   
Increased efficiency of N fertilizer; organic fertilization; legumes and 
green manure; compost; animal manure 
Lower variability more likely where good drainage and drought infrequent; 
experience can reduce farm-level variability over time 
Potentially greater variability with frequent droughts 
Tillage/residue management   
Incorporation of residues  Reduced variability due to increased soil fertility, water holding capacity 
Reduced/zero tillage  Reduced variability due to reduced erosion and improved soil structure, 
increased soil fertility, better pest control and improved water retention 
Water management   
Irrigation  Reduced variability in well-functioning systems 
Bunds/zai  Reduced variability in dry areas with low likelihood of floods and/or good soil 
drainage 
Terraces, contour farming  Reduced variability due to improved soil quality and rainwater management 
Water harvesting (e.g. runoff collection techniques, water storage tank 
construction, devices for lifting and conveying water) 
 
Perennials and Agroforestry   
Live barriers/fences  Reduced variability 
Various agroforestry practices: undersowing of Tephrosia vogelii, 
pigeon pea and Sesbania sesban in maize for soil fertility 
improvement; dispersed tree interplanting (e.g. Faidherbia, Acacia 
polycantha, A.galpiniii. + contour grass hedges) 
Reduced variability of agroforestry products; also likely reduced variability of 
crops due to improved soil fertility and structure, and greater water holding 
capacity 
Improved pasture management   
Improving forage quality and quantity  Reduced variability where improved forage is adapted to local conditions 
Potentially increased variability where improved forage is more sensitive to 
climate conditions than natural pasture 
Seeding fodder grasses  Reduced variability where seeded fodder is adapted to local conditions 
Potentially increased variability where improved seeded fodder is more 
sensitive to climate conditions than natural pasture 
Improving vegetation community structure (e.g. seeding fodder 
grasses or legumes; reducing fuel load by vegetation management) 
Reduced variability due to improved soil structure, reduced erosion Improved grazing management   
Stocking rate management  Potentially lower variability in long-term, where forage availability is key 
factor in livestock output variability 
Rotational grazing  Potentially lower variability in long-term, where forage availability is key 
factor in livestock output variability 
Restoring degraded land   
Re-vegetation  Reduced variability in local landscape due to reduced wind, soil, and/or water 
erosion 
Applying nutrient amendments (manures, biosolids, compost)   References 
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